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Abstract 
China has drawn massive benefits via expanded trade since it acceded to the WTO in 2001. We might 
therefore reasonably expect it to have taken a more assertive lead in trying to rectify the travails in which 
the organisation finds itself mired, attendant with its rising power status, its active trade diplomacy 
elsewhere, the high levels of relative gains it has enjoyed since becoming a member, and its broader 
trade dependency. That China has not done so represents a puzzle, which is usually answered with 
reference to the international picture: i.e. that global trade has appeared to be holding up reasonably well 
throughout and beyond the global crisis, and, despite some inchoate protectionism, there generally exists 
a broad commitment to an open trading regime. Yet this only tells part of the story: China’s approach 
cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the structural context and there are, in fact, a series of interesting 
domestic explanations for why China has remained a ‘reluctant leader’ of the WTO too. On the basis of 
a series of interviews with Chinese experts, we offer a more complete account of these processes that 
better recognises patterns of agency, and how China navigates a contingent international order. 
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Introduction 
On 11 December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). The subsequent decade 
and a half has witnessed two intriguing processes of divergence. One is the country’s continued ‘rise’, 
propelled by staggering levels of growth that have outstripped even the most optimistic assessments 
from the turn of the millennium, such that it is now, depending on the measure adopted, either the first- 
or second-largest economy in the world. Because of the global distribution of power that this entails, it 
is increasingly shouldering the burden of management of an international order that is in a state of 
pronounced flux. The other is the relative decline of the WTO’s importance as a key institution of global 
politicking, and arguably even multilateral trade as a whole. This latter claim is certainly a controversial 
one to make. Yet it seems clear that the effective collapse of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the 
marked tendency towards exclusionary mega-trade agreements such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – which, albeit stalled for now, 
still represent the general direction of global travel – as well as the inability of the WTO itself to re-
envision a post-Doha agenda, would seem to confirm, at the very least, that the multilateral space into 
which China thrust itself in 2001 is considerably more unstable and constrained today than it was then. 
 
In light of these two broad claims about augmented Chinese power and WTO decline, we might 
reasonably ask: why has the country not sought to lead the organisation decisively, and thereby 
overcome some of the travails in which it currently finds itself? This question, its answer and 
implications seem especially pressing, as Hanns Günther Hilpert (2014, p. 5) has suggested, ‘given that 
there is no other area of international politics where China is yet so dominant and influential’. The 
country has benefitted enormously from its membership of the WTO, its spectacular growth over the 
past fifteen years has been primarily export-oriented and trade-driven, and, of late, this has involved 
upgrading quite significantly into high-technology, value-added sectors where its firms are often 
operating at the global cutting edge (see, inter alia: Henderson et al. 2012, Naughton 2014, Kennedy 
2016).  
 
Moreover, China’s ideological commitment to trade multilateralism appears genuine. It joined the WTO 
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in good faith, and has generally been a constructive, productive member. Debates, which are often 
polarised, regarding whether or not China represents a challenge to western order or an accommodation 
with it miss the point: the country has made extraordinary efforts to comply with its international 
obligations. It may not have always been entirely successful, but then neither are any of the major trade 
powers: everybody does their share of market distortion in one way or another. As the legal scholar 
Timothy Webster (2014, pp. 527–8) has put it: ‘Despite its prevalence, the “China as cheat” conceit 
does not capture China’s dynamic and evolving relationship with international law. If China is indeed 
an international scofflaw, why would it ratify so many treaties and join the vast majority of international 
organizations in the first place?’ This is particularly so when it comes to trade: given the scale of legal, 
political, regulatory, economic and even cultural reform required since 2001, it is remarkable the extent 
to which China has implemented WTO rules and regulations – and certainly so on paper, even if they 
have not been followed perfectly in practice – in a context where its elites were learning, almost from 
scratch, how to participate (see Kobayashi 2006, 2013, Scott and Wilkinson 2013).  
 
Existing accounts of the crisis in which the World Trade ‘Disorganization’ (Wong 2015) is apparently 
mired generally – and quite rightly – emphasize the structural factors conditioning the travails of global 
trade politics: in particular, the power imbalances generated by simultaneous US relative hegemonic 
decline and the on-going accretion of greater power by the larger developing countries which have 
stymied a wide-ranging multilateral accord (e.g. Wilkinson 2014, Muzaka and Bishop 2015, Hopewell 
2016, Meunier and Morin 2016, Trommer 2017, Murray-Evans 2019). Similarly, there are three specific 
factors to which Chinese reticence is generally attributed. First, and notwithstanding the very recent 
turn towards limited protectionism, global free trade has endured through and beyond the crisis, 
regardless of progress in negotiations at the WTO (see Siles-Brügge 2013). China arguably does not, 
therefore, require solutions to the multilateral conundrum in order to achieve its contemporary trade 
objectives. In this sense, it is critical to disentangle the broad trade regime from the evolution of the 
WTO itself beyond Doha (see Muzaka and Bishop 2015). China is at once highly dependent on the 
former and would have much to lose were the regime to unravel fully, but this does not necessarily 
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mean that it has much to either gain or lose from progress or continued decay in the latter (Hilpert 2014, 
p. 6).  
 
This brings us to the second, and related issue, which is the apparent lack of support for ‘bicycle’ 
theories of trade (see, for example: Bhagwati 1988) that held sway previously and emphasised the need 
for liberalisation to continue lest protectionism seep in to the system. The contemporary Trumpian 
backlash against the most extensive forms of liberalisation – such as TTIP, TPP – do not represent a 
repudiation of trade per se, but rather the neoliberal overreach characterised by the most strident forms 
of globalism. Ironically, as Dani Rodrik (2017), a prominent critic of bicycle theories has recently noted, 
the very fact that liberal economists downplayed the well-known distributional effects of trade 
liberalisation in order to prevent protectionist backsliding is a large part of the explanation for why 
peculiarly demagogic forms of nationalist rhetoric have now emerged. Indeed, it is notable that, despite 
the rhetoric and clumsy imposition of tariffs, Trump does not couch his critique – however incoherent 
it may be – in terms of ending free trade, but rather making it even freer by reducing what he considers 
unfair distorting practices elsewhere and undermining the multilateral system that facilitates them (see 
Bishop 2018b). Nonetheless, with the perceived link between continued multilateral liberalisation and 
global free trade evidently in question for now, there is perhaps less incentive for major players to 
worry. Third, many Chinese firms are increasingly operating at the innovation frontier. Consequently, 
their commercial interests will be served by deep next-generation regulatory and services agreements – 
if China is able to participate in them – not a multilateral accord that was conceived for a different era 
almost two decades ago. 
 
None of these arguments are misguided, but what they have in common is an emphasis on the 
structurally determined incentives shaping China’s trade policy. As a consequence, its ‘reluctant 
leadership’ – which we define as a deliberately conceived hesitancy to bring its substantial power 
resources to bear on re-energising the multilateral agenda at the WTO – is largely ‘read off’ from these 
externally determined factors as an unsurprising, straightforwardly explicable phenomenon. This is a 
problem: it elides Chinese agency and intention, and only tells part of a more complex story. Indeed, if 
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Hilpert (2014, p. 6) is correct that its ‘trade policy structures can be characterised as pluralistic, 
intransparent, reactive and unpredictable’ then it is especially problematic to suggest, even implicitly, 
that particular courses of action – in a highly dynamic arena of political contestation – can be explained 
solely with recourse to the prevailing structural context. In this paper, we therefore seek to redress this 
imbalance by shedding some light on the pluralism of Chinese trade policymaking and the conscious 
choices that have been made at different junctures to engage in global trade politics in particular ways.  
 
Specifically, on the basis of a set of interviews with current and former Chinese trade policymakers,i 
we argue that any account that seeks to explain Chinese trade diplomacy must complement the typical 
focus on global institutional and structural constraints with an analysis of the distinctive contours of 
both domestic trade policymaking structures and the kinds of agency that these, in turn, facilitate. We 
build the argument in three sections. First, we discuss existing debates pertaining to Chinese leadership 
in global governance in general, and trade in particular, to show how structural explanations have 
generally dominated. Second, we address the reasons why this might be the case, by focusing on 
different domestic sources of policy constraint. Third, we bring the international picture ‘back in’, but 
from a distinctly Chinese perspective, in order to show how some of the aforementioned structural 
constraints are viewed within, and refracted through, internal policy debates. 
 
Chinese leadership in global (trade) governance  
We substantiate in this section the wider claim about the nature of Chinese leadership in global 
governance as a whole, and trade politics in particular. A key concern of many Western theorists 
regarding China’s ‘rise’ is the extent to which it is likely to accommodate itself to – or, indeed, seek to 
undermine and replace – existing institutions that are the product of post-1945 US leadership (Narlikar 
2010). However, what is less recognised, amid often-misplaced worries about the creation of post-
hegemonic alternatives attendant with the construction of a Sinic world order or ‘Beijing Consensus’, 
is that China has actually long-reconciled itself to being a key member of global bodies, even if it has 
not accepted fully the liberal logics of western forms of modernity, particularly when it comes to 
democracy. This is, in the West, frequently and teleologically presented as a Chinese problem, in that 
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it is somehow deficient and yet to achieve fully an acceptable form of modernity (see Hobson 2012, for 
a thorough critique).  
 
But, as Andrew Gamble (2009, p. 19) has argued, the real problem is the tendency to conflate Western 
ideology and praxis with modernity, when we should ‘distinguish between the genuinely universal 
aspects of the western ideology, those that need to be accepted as the common basis for all societies 
that make the transition to modernity, and those aspects that are related to particular historical features 
of European societies’. This implies that there can be different routes to modernity, and different forms 
of it, and there is no reason why these cannot coexist, as they will increasingly have to, as more societies 
reach late capitalism and further shift the global distribution of economic power. It requires a 
recognition on the part of the West that, say, Anglo-American institutions and mores represent but one 
possible form of modernity, and to accommodate the non-West into global institutions requires them to 
be reconfigured to take account of greater diversity. This is what Chinese economic statecraft is about: 
that is, ensuring, as a member that arrived late to shaping the global economic governance architecture, 
its interests are properly served (Zhang and Keith 2017, p. 185). 
 
In any case, confusion and contestation exists within China regarding how to understand the country’s 
political-economic system and development model, just as it does outside, belying either the idea of a 
‘consensus’ or, indeed, the kind of coherence necessary to fully eclipse existing norms and implant 
new, distinct, genuinely hegemonic alternatives (see Ferchen 2011, Breslin 2013). Moreover, China is 
a committed and increasingly engaged participant in global institution building. The WTO does not find 
itself in crisis because of attempts by China or the other rising powers to wind back free trade: it is 
actually the failure of the supposedly liberal West to live up to its rhetoric and pursue an inclusive, 
comprehensive, multilateral agreement of benefit to all, which achieves the development gains for the 
poorest that were originally promised when Doha commenced, that better explains the problem (see 
Hopewell 2016). Part of China’s commitment to trade openness reflects its recent economic expansion: 
it accounts for an increasingly large share of global GDP and international investment, and therefore 
requires internationally agreed rules to protect its burgeoning asset portfolio (Morton 2017). This has, 
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of course, generally been true of all trade powers as they approach dominance, because perpetuating 
international openness in which one occupies an advantageous position is the best way to exploit and 
propagate that power (Chang 2002). 
 
The very fact that China joined the WTO in 2001 – in a context of significant internal opposition, 
widespread scepticism in parts of the policy elite, and fears of effective capitalist neo-colonisation by 
the West (see Fewsmith 2001) – is revealing in this regard. Reflecting on accession a decade later as he 
himself came to the end of his presidency, Hu Jintao (2011) restated the case for Chinese membership 
specifically in terms of on-going, incomplete – and domestically contentious – economic reform: ‘To 
join the WTO’, he suggested, ‘was a major strategic decision based on our comprehensive analysis of 
the situation at home and abroad in order to push forward China’s reform and opening-up and socialist 
modernization drive’. Moreover, where it has participated in multilateral endeavours it has actually 
been remarkably active in terms of institutionalising international regulatory imperatives. For example, 
in a recent study of China’s ‘insertion’ into the intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime, Omar Serrano 
(2016) noted how, despite a domestic predilection for violations of IPRs by market actors, the Chinese 
state itself has implemented TRIPS in a ‘maximalist’ fashion, and certainly considerably more so than 
India. Although, at the same time, Beijing has also not been as activist in shaping WTO agendas 
themselves as the other emerging powers: Brazil and India played a more important role in developing 
Doha and confronting the West, even though they had far fewer conventional power resources with 
which to do so, a reflection of their (relatively) more diminutive economic might (Hopewell 2015, 
Muzaka 2017). 
 
Nevertheless, China has still benefitted hugely from liberal trading arrangements. When Beijing first 
considered accession to the WTO, it was an extremely controversial idea domestically. There was great 
reticence among many powerful actors, which was only overcome – and, indeed, only could have been 
overcome – when Jiang Zemin decided to push the agenda from the very top during his presidency in 
the late 1990s. Different policy choices would have led to different outcomes, and there remain to this 
day significant divergences of opinion within the policy elite between more conservative, protectionist 
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voices and those advocating greater liberalisation (see Jiang 2013). As such, the pace and extent of 
reform is both an enduring, unresolved site of contestation and can also be influenced heavily by 
directions given from the very top of the power structure. Still, during this period China has grown 
dramatically, outstripping even the most optimistic expectations from that earlier era (Bishop 2016). 
Although its export orientation has been clear for many decades now, not all of this expansion can be 
attributed to increased trade: it is something which is, in many respects, based on arguably quite 
mercantilist, developmentalist, state-directed investment and control over key sectors of the economy 
and major firms within them (Lin et al 2003, Lin 2014). It is consequently probable that, whether China 
had joined the WTO or not, it would still have enjoyed an impressive period of expansionary growth, 
and the export orientation of its key industries would have still occurred in some form. As Susan Strange 
(1985) argued many years ago, modern trading relations depend less on the existence of formal trade 
rules than they do networks of relationships between companies and other actors that collectively pursue 
mutually beneficial commercial activities.  
 
But had China not joined the WTO, the specific patterns of growth and economic development would 
undoubtedly have been different. This is a key point, and it is something that is less frequently 
recognised than it should be. Although the early (post-2001) stage of contemporary industrial expansion 
was driven by significant amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) into mid-level production of 
components, textiles and so on, Chinese firms have both rapidly climbed the value chain and expanded 
into new areas of production (Chin 2009). It is quite plausible in fact, that had it not acceded to the 
WTO, many of its firms could have remained in relatively low value-added activity, with the country 
itself mired in a broader low- (not even middle-) income trap. However, the opposite has happened. 
Chinese firms are today increasingly exporting their own, high value-added products – high-speed 
trains, military and satellite technology, mobile communications technology and so on – all over the 
world, and especially to markets in Africa, Asia and Latin America that are far from mature (Henderson 
et al. 2013, Naughton 2014, Kennedy 2016). As one experienced trade negotiator suggested, this was a 
primary benefit of membership: WTO rules permitted the imposition of high external standards on 
domestic firms, and, by combining a degree of control over both the direction of capital and major 
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companies themselves, compelled them to become increasingly competitive. In short, joining the WTO 
and engaging in liberalisation was not an end in itself for trade policymakers in Beijing. It was, rather, 
a means to gain access to a body of external rules and regulations and thereby provoke domestic forms 
of upgrading in strategic sectors. The market opening that it implied was undeniably useful for Chinese 
firms as they continued their export growth, but it was not a sufficient condition to ensure that such 
expansion also resulted in diversification and upgrading. 
 
So, why might we therefore expect China to take up a leadership position that goes beyond mainly 
implementing agreements and acting, as Kristen Hopewell (2015, p. 315) puts it, in a more ‘proactive 
agenda-setting’ fashion, rather than ‘as a reactive veto power’? In the most straightforward sense, given 
the broad benefits it has accrued from participation in liberalised global trade politics, it is reasonable 
to expect that China might wish to revitalise the WTO and sustain a multilateral regime that is, at the 
very least, in question today (see Muzaka and Bishop 2015). Most crucial to this is the idea that the 
country has not simply benefitted from any old trade rules, but rather the predictable, broad-based and 
widely accepted rules that all members of the organisation have essentially agreed to. The problem, 
today, is not that liberalisation itself is straightforwardly under threat: indeed, if the crisis has shown 
anything, it is that powerful actors in general, and the US and EU in particular, favour the deeper 
penetration of liberalising dynamics into an even wider range of areas than has ever been the case 
before. Trump’s withdrawal from TPP and the consequences of this for TTIP may lead to their terminal 
decline, or they may be resuscitated once his presidency is over. Either way, this does not signal a 
general resurgence of multilateral sentiment, but it also does not imply the end of free trade as a 
principle. Trumpists (and, as noted earlier, Brexiters) alike have retained a rhetorical commitment to 
global openness even as they remain sceptical about the multilateral institutions that have, until now, 
facilitated it (see Murray-Evans 2018, pp. 151–3). 
 
The specific form of liberalisation that underpinned China’s economic miracle for almost two decades 
is one that has been based on broadly shared, multilateral agreement, embedded within a WTO which 
has now rapidly collapsed into crisis. We do not have to look very far back – to the immediate aftermath 
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of China’s accession – to see a period during which the WTO was the institution of global governance 
par excellence in which the major political battles of the day were being played out. For Chinese 
policymakers, this shift is disorientating: we have moved, almost overnight, from a world in which a 
commitment to multilateralism has given way to the major players seeking to shape extensive 
agreements that go well beyond that which has been agreed at the collective level and which are 
deliberately exclusionary. The WTO Ministerials in Nairobi (2015) and Buenos Aires (2017) evince 
this clearly: the former witnessed the explicit abandonment of the ‘single undertaking’ and, at the latter, 
the direction of travel towards plurilateralism was reinforced (see Wilkinson 2018, Hannah, Scott and 
Wilkinson 2018). In sum, after welcoming China into the organisation almost twenty years ago, the US 
and EU are now seeking to rewrite the rules of global trade and, in doing so, shape a new order that 
excludes the world’s most significant trade power.  
 
Explaining Chinese reticence: Domestic sources of policy constraint 
That China has not responded more forcefully or decisively to this situation can be explained, as we 
noted earlier, by a set of structural realities. These are broadly linked to the fact that the global trade 
regime has – notwithstanding the prospect of Trumpian rhetoric becoming a more widespread reality – 
remained open throughout the biggest economic crisis of the neoliberal era (Siles-Brügge 2013). This 
compels us, analytically speaking, to separate the WTO from the broader edifice of global trade. China 
does not require a multilateral settlement to achieve its trade objectives, nor, apparently, does the global 
trade regime itself seem to require continued multilateral liberalisation to stay afloat (at least at present). 
However, this is only part of the story. In this section, we add to it a set of insights that focus on the 
often-overlooked internal elements of China’s reluctant leadership of the WTO: the keeping of a 
deliberately low profile in international politics while trying to reconcile a dual identity as both a 
developing and, increasingly, a developed country; contestation between different domestic interest 
groups, and a distinctive state-business relationship; and the fluctuating importance of trade within 
government policymaking. 
 
Dual identities: ‘Neither leading goat, nor stumbling block’ 
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When China first acceded to the WTO, Madame Wu Yi – who was Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Co-operation from 1993-1998 during much of the accession negotiations, and who then 
became Vice-Premier shortly after accession in 2003 – explicitly announced that China should neither 
lead the organisation nor be pulled along by it. This was encapsulated in a famous phrase, suggesting 
that the country should ‘neither be the leading goat, nor a stumbling block’.ii This essentially means 
that the early stages of WTO diplomacy would be marked by a slow start in which Chinese diplomats 
learned the ropes, attended every meeting and gradually increased their patterns of engagement in a 
deliberately and consciously constructive way. At the time, as western academics searched for clues as 
to how China would comport itself in the WTO, Ann Kent (2002, p. 345) noted how, if its ‘newcomer 
status’ to the UN in the thirty years after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
were a good guide, its engagement ‘involved a steep learning curve, mediated by its own ambitions, 
changing perceptions, and unique perspectives’. Yet over time, she suggests, its approach evolved, 
‘from the aloof posture of a spectator sizing up the game to active participation and a lively and astute 
promotion of its national interests’.  
 
From a contemporary vantage point, this seems to capture its subsequent behaviour in the trade arena 
too. This vision of diplomacy is very much related to Deng Xiaoping’s famous warning that China 
should keep a low profile in general, a form of foreign policy that spilled over into its approach to the 
WTO. It was, moreover, largely psychological rather than institutional. Officials believed that the 
country needed a period of learning before it could assume a leadership role, and almost a period of 
apprenticeship in which it behaved as a model student (Zhang and Keith 2017, p. 190). Early on, Beijing 
was also extremely uncomfortable with international lawsuits, and was keen to avoid confrontation in 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). So, it consciously crafted a highly disciplined and 
moderate orientation, and it studiously avoided conflict. This kind of ‘low-profile’ diplomacy also had 
a broader historical genesis. Mao Zedong appreciated the Min Dynasty Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang’s 
strategy ‘to build high walls, to accumulate grains and claim to be an emperor at a later stage’. In other 
words, China’s traditional wisdom emphasises that great power status can wait, for what in the western 
mindset might be a very long time. 
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Contemporary China is, moreover, caught between a pervasive self-perception as a ‘developing’ 
country that co-exists in a degree of tension with the reality that the country is rapidly becoming, 
through a profound structural transformation, a ‘developed’ one. This is visible within the range of 
internal contradictions that can be identified. An obvious one is the contrast between a rural peasantry 
that remains large – in the tens of millions at least (see Yeh et al. 2013) – and a growing urban middle 
class. Indeed, one statistic that reflects China’s stunning transformation is that its GDP per capita has 
increased since the turn of the millennium from barely $1,000 USD – a figure that was lower than many 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa – to almost $10,000 in 2019, and considerably more in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) terms (Bishop 2016). In any country, let alone one where mean average per capita 
figures are difficult to shift substantially because of an enormous population of 1.386 billion (in 2017) 
this is striking (by contrast, India’s GDP per capita has quadrupled – itself impressive – but only from 
around $450 to almost $1900 over the same period). As Andrew Kennedy (2016) suggests in an 
evocative turn of phrase, of the two largest ‘BRIC’ countries, India is the ‘slouching tiger’ to China’s 
‘roaring dragon’. What is more, when disaggregated by city or region, vast numbers of Chinese are now 
living in essentially ‘developed’ country conditions: in many of the major cities – especially on the 
eastern seaboard – GDP per capita is now well over $20,000, outstripping in many cases living standards 
in western countries, and the figure is even higher in PPP terms. 
 
Nonetheless, China’s contemporary political identity is one that still identifies strongly with the wider 
‘developing’ world or ‘Global South’ (as problematic as these concepts may be). This is reflected in a 
degree of suspicion – or rather a relative lack of dogmatism – regarding the tensions between the West 
and major developing countries that have effectively stymied Doha, and which have been problematic 
ever since the controversial ‘Singapore issues’ emerged at the 1996 Ministerial (see Gallagher 2008). 
When China first considered entry to the nascent WTO, it exhibited a degree of tentative ambivalence 
about the need for further sustained across-the-board liberalisation in trade, and this was especially so 
in the case of some powerful interests within the country. Today, this lives on in a sense that developing 
countries as a whole should not be pushed beyond that which they have already properly agreed to at 
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the multilateral level; the forms of market-opening preferred by Chinese policymakers are consensual 
ones, and there is an acceptance that different countries, of different sizes and levels of development, 
should be able to engage flexibly with multilateral accords to maximise their development policy space. 
 
Equally, though, its economic identity – given its constellation of offensive interests – is very much 
aligned with the rich world. This makes it difficult for Beijing to advocate for flexible interpretations 
of existing agreements for developing countries as a whole. Powerful countries view this as self-serving, 
and are for the most part understandably unwilling to facilitate what they see as an already-colossal 
Chinese competitiveness advantage that would increase yet further from greater selective protectionism. 
Perhaps more important, though, is the fact that China embodies unreconciled internal contradictions 
in terms of its own development. For example, it is a member of both the G33 and the G20 coalitions 
in the WTO: yet the former has defensive interests in agriculture; the latter has offensive ones. 
Moreover, distributionally, liberalisation affects different groups within China in highly distinct ways. 
Again, in agriculture most obviously, concessions made in negotiations could have highly destabilising 
ramifications for the country’s massive rural peasantry even though the overall welfare gains – both for 
China as a whole, and globally – might be significant. Consequently, even were China in a position to 
formulate a clear policy agenda for rescuing trade multilateralism, it would find it difficult to do so 
because its own interests remain so unclear and are continually (and often rapidly) evolving. 
 
This is particularly so today, for two reasons that essentially foster a continued identification with the 
Global South. One is that China is no longer simply a developing country in its own imagination, but 
also a member of the so-called BRICS. Much has been written on the development of the grouping and 
its role in global governance (e.g. Stuenkel 2013, Chin 2014, Cooper 2016). As the group becomes 
increasingly institutionalised, China enjoys another base from which to assert its difference from the 
rich world and continue to negotiate as a developing country of sorts. For example, Chinese trade 
policymakers are highly critical of both the lack of flexibility shown towards the developing world as 
a whole during the Doha ‘development’ Round and the continued unwillingness to fully take into 
account the concerns of major emerging countries which still retain huge and acutely vulnerable 
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impoverished populations requiring of a degree of protection from, say, food price shocks. The other 
issue is that this is influenced – for better or worse – by China’s own ongoing development. On the one 
hand, the competitive dislocations wrought by the country’s sheer scale creates acute challenges for 
other developing countries in just about every economic sector, and especially agriculture (Hopewell 
2019). Yet on the other hand, now that it is so wealthy, Chinese policymakers stress their responsibility 
to pull other developing countries up too, particularly given that many of them recognised the 
sovereignty of the PRC when it was difficult to do so. 
 
Whether or not this is borne out in terms of the actual form and effect of Chinese policy is another 
matter. One does not have to subscribe to an orthodox liberal view – that China has now simply joined 
the rich world, and will therefore increasingly engage aggressively with poorer countries based on a 
rational evaluation of its interests – to see that tensions clearly exist. Indeed, although it took a back 
seat before and during the Doha negotiations, China has gradually become somewhat more assertive 
when defending those substantive interests in the WTO’s legal regime as it has become more 
comfortable within the institution (see Gu et al. 2008). Similarly, much has also been written that 
debates the ‘imperial’ dimensions of its resource diplomacy and commercial activity in Africa and Latin 
America (see, inter alia Brautigam 2009, Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010, Power et al. 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, a discourse of developmental unity still represents a well-embedded norm that frames, at 
a minimum, both the rhetorical dimensions of China’s policymaking and the instinctive thinking of its 
policymakers. As one clear example of this, Beijing has invested heavily in the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), and it is by far the largest contributor, providing $50 billion (half) of its start-
up funds. This money is at least partly geared towards supporting the activities of the BRICS 
Development Bank – now renamed the New Development Bank (NDB) – to which China has 
contributed an equal share ($10 billion, rising to $20 billion) as the other four members. It also 
established the $3 billion South-South development fund at the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2015, and used export finance in general as a way of driving trade-based accumulation. At 
the very least, then, Chinese trade policy embodies a distinct understanding of responsibility towards 
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the developing world as whole, and a genuine desire to advance its wider economic interests in tandem 
with that. Yet equally, because of its dual identity and the fluctuating political-economic dynamics 
underpinning it, it would be difficult for China to offer clear leadership of the WTO as a whole, or set 
out a new agenda that might realise such widely dispersed benefits. 
 
Internal contestation 
It is hard to overstate just what a revolutionary process WTO accession was for much of the Chinese 
bureaucracy, in diplomatic, institutional and symbolic terms alike. As Hilpert (2014, p. 11) puts it: 
‘Although China joined the WTO as a developing country, it had to make far-reaching commitments 
on market opening and liberalisation that were without parallel in the history of GATT and the WTO’ 
(emphasis added). He further notes that it was only because of the imperative of accession that Prime 
Minister Zhu Rhongji was able to impose such radical policies against the wishes of those opposing 
reform, many of whom today still feel that the price of admission was too high. This, moreover, remains 
an enduring question: it continues to be reproduced in debates over the pace, timing and, ultimately, 
extent of China’s continued opening up to the global economy.  
 
In an intriguing inversion of the conventional ‘policy space’ debate – whereby poorer developing 
countries are seen to have their industrialisation options hemmed in by WTO accords (see, inter alia, 
Wade 2003, Rodrik 2004, Shadlen 2005, Gallagher 2008) – it is externally-mandated liberalisation 
which has driven growth and augmented China’s freedom for manoeuvre. However, the likelihood of 
reformists successfully making the case for further domestic liberalisation is much higher if the external 
body of regulation provides for that possibility, which, at present, it does not. Other institutions in the 
bureaucracy depend on protectionism to maintain and extend their own considerable space for initiative. 
As a consequence, throughout the 1990s there were fierce internal battles over the very idea of 
liberalisation via WTO membership, an outcome that was never assured, and even today remains highly 
contested. Some ministries and economic governance institutions remain reticent about greater 
liberalisation, since this would deprive them of, firstly, certain privileges, and, secondly, when 
conducted by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) via the WTO, control over the nature of that 
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liberalisation. Consequently, ‘reformists’ and ‘conservatives’ still have to collectively negotiate a 
policymaking environment characterised by increased fragmentation in which they counterbalance each 
other (Jiang 2013, 2016). 
 
This is not simply a case of inconsequential battles over the protection of bureaucratic empires. The 
challenges facing many ministries are acutely sensitive. A typical example is the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which is – quite understandably – reluctant to liberalise the agricultural sector for fear of 
the broader consequences for farming. In a country with, as suggested above, tens of millions of often-
poor people still employed on the land, where the thorny challenge of rebalancing is already underway 
(see Bishop 2018a), it is hardly surprising that powerful interests are loath to risk destabilising a 
peasantry that has undermined many dynasties during China’s long history. In a similar vein, the 
National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) is also reluctant to liberalise for fear of domestic 
infant industries, which in many cases are not yet globally competitive, coming under heavy pressure. 
Perhaps even more importantly, we also have to bear in mind that China is not necessarily a naturally 
liberal-trading country. Therefore, its bureaucratic set-up – and thus the orientation of its ministries – 
was largely designed to stabilise a uniquely enormous domestic polity, economy and society before the 
era of globalisation began. National security is also an important consideration: it is often used to guard 
against large-scale liberalisation while China is still feeling its way to modernity. Underpinning all of 
this is a serious degree of geographical and regional diversity: marked regional differences of political 
economy – or ‘varieties of capitalism’ – can be identified, too, with some provincial governments 
exhibiting a more liberal orientation while others are of a distinctly statist bent (Breslin 2011, Mulvad 
2015). 
 
There also exist vested interests in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which often push back against 
liberalisation. This may be problematic, since China is reaching the innovation frontier in some sectors, 
something that potentially requires a greater injection of competitive pressure and more nimble 
management to effect successful international market performance (Kennedy 2016). As a consequence, 
there is growing recognition that these firms have begun to outlive their crucial role in stimulating and 
17 
driving industrialisation, and, in some cases, are oversized, inefficient and serving to crowd out private 
investment and further innovation. However, the relative slowdown that has become evident since 2014, 
along with the market jitters of 2015 and beyond that have been intensified by Trump’s tariff war 
throughout 2018, as well as the tricky process of rebalancing, all potentially strengthen the hand of 
those advocating a slower pace of continued opening up and reform.  
 
Almost every industrial sector in China, however advanced or globalised, finds itself in a sensitive 
existential position, somewhere between growth and expansion amidst an ongoing slowdown, 
sometimes with substantial accumulated overhanging debt, as the state grapples with economic 
challenges that are coming to a head at the same time (see Bishop 2018a). These include: high levels 
environmental degradation, and mounting inequality between rich and poor and the rural and urban 
populations (Hsu 2015); a need to transcend the so-called ‘Lewis Turning-Point’, where the glut of rural 
labour dries up as urbanisation peaks, putting upward pressure on wages and thereby dramatically 
reducing export competitiveness (Das and N'Diaye 2013); and a consequent need to avoid the middle-
income trap that some thinkers (e.g. Zeng and Fang 2014) view as a distinct possibility. As such, the 
argument that reform-sceptics can make is a straightforward one, particularly since it finds echoes on 
the lips of some western leaders now: that is, it is safer to eschew liberalisation, regardless of the 
economic merits of that process, if it will ultimately cost jobs and risk an even broader social 
dislocation. 
 
Another issue relates to the lack of a clear government-business ‘transmission belt’ in the country’s 
external trade negotiations, something that is central to the US and EU approaches. Although China has 
chambers of commerce and business associations, it seems that they do not always effectively represent 
the interests of businesses. There are two reasons. First, the government remains quite dominant 
economically and believes that it both knows what characterises the business interest and can represent 
it. Second, businesses themselves are not particularly well organised and, as a consequence, do not play 
such an active role in terms of directing the government to act on their behalf. This is exacerbated by 
the fact that many of China’s most powerful business institutions are either state-owned, quasi-state 
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controlled or recipients of privileged market positions (as national champions). Even emergent global 
players frequently enjoy some form of public support. This is true at both the national level and at the 
provincial or local level, where regional governments have large stakes in firms and industries. In short, 
then, the government-business relationship in China is very different from that which prevails in the 
West: many business associations function effectively as an extension of the state, and their senior 
people are often former public officials. As part of its broader economic transition, the government is 
seeking to reform these associations, with the aim of making them more responsive to, and driven by, 
their membership, but this is likely to be a slow process. 
 
The Fluctuating Importance of Trade Policy 
Trade has rarely been what we might describe as a ‘tier one’ issue in China. The leadership is keen on 
pushing reform and opening-up, but it has traditionally relied on the line ministries, mainly MOFCOM, 
to facilitate liberalisation. However, given the centralisation of steering power in the executive, much 
depends on the extent to which trade is considered a primary or secondary concern at a given juncture. 
This changes according to the prevailing orientation of different administrations, and the wider context 
at a given time (including the nature of negotiations themselves). So, the key challenge facing Chinese 
trade policymakers relates to whether or not there is, at a certain moment, sufficient will emanating 
from the top to be assertive in leading negotiations and other initiatives at the WTO. There is, in this 
regard, a significant contrast between the eras of Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) and that of Hu 
Jintao-Wen Jiabao (2003-2013). During the Jiang-Zhu period, the top leadership directly intervened in 
the negotiation process. For example, Zhu himself came to the MOFCOM meeting with the incumbent 
American chief trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky at the last critical moment before the US-China 
deal.iii However, during the time of Hu-Wen, the Chinese leadership mainly relied on MOFCOM to 
lead the WTO negotiations, thereby reducing its relative weight within Chinese domestic bureaucratic 
politics. 
 
When Jiang Zemin was in office, WTO membership was a clear priority. His administration pushed 
WTO initiatives from the centre, helping MOFCOM to coordinate policy in Geneva with other 
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ministries and institutions in the bureaucracy. Today, with a different set of domestic priorities and the 
fact that there appears to be little to be gained from multilateral trade politicking, relatively less political 
capital is invested in it. Although it remains important, then, the WTO in general – and the stalled Doha 
process – appears a second-tier issue for now. There is no little irony here. Early on, when China was 
more fully engaged in the process, ‘it preferred’, as Matthew Eagleton-Pierce (2013, p. 79) has 
suggested, ‘to adopt quiet modes of diplomacy that did not appear to trouble Northern actors unduly’. 
However, as Beijing has accrued more power, and become more assertive when defending its interests, 
it has simultaneously eschewed decisive action at the point where it is both probably most able to 
exercise its influence and the multilateral process has fallen into deep disrepair. China still does not 
wish to be the ‘leading goat’. Some have questioned the effectiveness of this strategy, and the extent to 
which it still represents a plausible form of leadership for such a powerful country which is no longer 
‘learning the ropes’ (Hopewell 2015, p. 328). 
 
This reticence, then, certainly has a strategic component, and it could consequently be viewed, from a 
classically materialist IR perspective, as a form of reluctant hegemony: that is, China does not wish to 
pay the costs – particularly in terms of potential conflict – that more forceful interventions might 
occasion. However, a more generous interpretation would be that, even though policy leadership 
functions today within an increasingly ‘fragmented, decentralised and internationalised state’ (Hameiri 
and Jones 2016, p. 72), fundamental shifts still have to be authorised – and authored – from above. 
Consequently, MOFCOM and the wider trade policymaking bureaucracy within China are, on the one 
hand, increasingly enmeshed in evolving, expanding networks of influence, which in turn inherently 
shape quotidian negotiating strategies. However, on the other, altering the enduring rationale that 
underpins those strategies is impossible without leadership buy-in, but, once that change of direction is 
signalled, it is likely to cascade down into policy rapidly and decisively. Whether such a shift is 
presently plausible remains moot, as multilateral trade is not top of the current leadership’s in-tray. Part 
of the issue has always been that, as Doha progressed, it became clear that it might not stimulate much 
new trade anyway (Scott and Wilkinson 2011). This in turn helps to explain the rise of regional/bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), a number of which, as we discuss in the next section, threaten China. 
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Bringing the international back in (from a Chinese perspective) 
Until now, we have emphasised how structural explanations of China’s leadership – or otherwise – of 
global trade politics need to be complemented by a deeper focus on domestic peculiarities. But what do 
international sources of constraint look like, from a Chinese vantage point? We focus here on the 
aforementioned shift to bilaterals. But first, it is worth contextualising the discussion by noting that 
geopolitics matters for China in a way that it does not for the West. This is partly reflective of its still-
subservient position within the western world order more broadly. But it also has a regional or 
continental dimension: Beijing has to continually factor the reactions of other great powers into its 
decision-making in a defensive way, in a fashion that the West does not. One obvious aspect of this is 
the relationship with Russia, which, at present, is going through something of a ‘honeymoon’. 
Nonetheless, as China negotiates, for example, an FTA with Georgia, the key question in the minds of 
Georgian diplomats relates to how Moscow might react. This in turn influences the nature of the 
Chinese engagement, which, for industrial and geopolitical reasons, is conditioned by the desire to 
export infrastructure, especially high-speed rail. Yet Russia, which has always considered itself 
hemmed in and with a desperate need to expand to the seas, may interpret this as provocative, even 
though, from the Chinese perspective, it is primarily about expanding commercial opportunities and 
connectivity in Asia, rather than any intrinsic geopolitical or hegemonic aspirations.   
 
This brings us to FTAs such as the TPP and TTIP, which, although presently on ice in these specific 
manifestations, have represented a challenge, and continue to do so. It is sometimes remarked that China 
is not yet ready to engage in the kind of restructuring that participation in such advanced ‘behind the 
border’ agreements would imply. This argument undeniably acts as useful discursive cover for 
processes that are deliberately exclusionary. But, in certain respects, it is also true. There are two 
particularly sensitive issues: the role of markets dominated by SOEs and their gradual, rather than 
forced, sudden and destabilising liberalisation; and the question of workers’ rights. But Chinese trade 
policymakers stress that these problems are far from insurmountable: WTO accession – indeed, simply 
gaining the requisite commitment to even consider joining the body – was infinitely more arduous than 
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adjusting to the imperatives of TPP would be. Moreover, were China to be invited to join a mega-
agreement with the US and EU, and it made such a leap, these could plausibly act as external anchors 
of policy reform: using the past as a guide, it has regularly caught up with international standards that, 
at the time, seemed daunting and even impossible to meet. 
 
More broadly, it appears difficult to understand western attempts at exclusion as anything other than a 
failure of diplomacy: the US and EU, in particular, have missed an opportunity to engage a policy 
community within China that, at times, has found itself marginalised, and therefore failed to assist its 
members in making the kinds of political and technical arguments required to overcome the powerful 
interests inhibiting deeper reform. As it is, the Chinese academic and policy communities have mixed 
views about TPP: broadly speaking, one group views it as a strategic attempt at encircling China; the 
other considers it a positive spur for domestic reform and opening-up. Although the government 
adopted an open and flexible posture towards TPP, it has moved strategically by accelerating the 
negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the China-Korea FTA, 
as well as updating its FTA with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and further 
buttressing other regional institutions (Chin 2016). More interesting, perhaps, are China’s new 
initiatives for building two grand silk roads: one to Central Asia, leading on to Europe, and the other to 
Southeast Asia, leading on to the Indian Ocean. These developments represent China’s renewed 
confidence in finding its role in Asia, and, to some extent, an expansive response to its exclusion from 
western initiatives. 
 
As with TPP, the responses of Chinese intellectuals to TTIP have been similarly mixed, and fall into 
three broad categories: positive, ‘marginal impact’ and negative (and our analysis here includes the 
obvious caveat that the agreement may well never be completed). The first group believes that, in the 
long and enduring aftermath of the twin crises of the US sub-prime mortgage market and European 
sovereign debt, it is indeed good news for the world trading system that the US and the EU, as two of 
the largest economies in the world, launched the negotiations.iv They generally expect, notwithstanding 
the unpredictability injected into the process by Trump’s election, the US and the EU to shoulder their 
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responsibilities in the world trading system, and carry out genuine reform and re-adjustments in their 
own sensitive trading areas (such as regulatory issues and geographical indications), and substantively 
reduce trade barriers. In so doing, they expect TTIP to have a positive effect on the rest of the world.v 
On this reading, it can equally have spillover effects by putting peer pressure on other ongoing bilateral 
and multilateral trade negotiations.vi  Some Chinese intellectuals even predict that, if TTIP moves 
forward smoothly, it might breathe life into the Doha Round negotiations again.vii Secondly, TTIP is 
considered good for China and other newly emerging economies based on the idea that transatlantic 
economic integration might be able to spur China’s external trade, investment and economic growth.viii 
They believe that TTIP can boost world economic growth and therefore bring renewed momentum for 
China’s further integration into a globalising world economy.ix 
 
Those intellectuals that favour a ‘marginal impact’ explanation tend to believe that the Chinese export 
structure is highly complementary to those of the US and EU, and a free trade agreement between the 
latter will not change that complementarity. Since existing international trade norms and the contours 
of the international economic order have long been set by the US and European countries, TTIP will 
not overthrow or decisively undermine existing rules.x Others find that, although the US and EU have 
been fundamentally attempting to bypass emerging and developing countries to foster next-generation 
deep regulatory agreements and augment their existing advantages, China needs to be confident and 
show indifference to their actions. With the collective rise of myriad emerging economies and the 
increasing shift in the balance of power in the world, any international trade issue such as the reform of 
global trade governance cannot be properly or conclusively handled without their participation.xi This 
effectively means that, regardless of the direction of travel in TTIP (and TPP) the realities of the power 
structures of global trade will ultimately require the inclusion of new powers to a significant degree, 
not least since many of them are also involved in emergent Chinese-led forms of commercial and trade 
cooperation, through, for example, the RCEP and One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiatives. This actually 
reflects, in certain respects, a modern variant of the argument made by Susan Strange (1985) many 
years ago to which we alluded earlier in the paper. 
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Opinion in the ‘negative’ impact category is more influential. Even those who believe that TTIP might 
boost global growth emphasise its downsides, particularly when it comes to setting new rules against 
the interests of China and other developing countries. Chinese intellectuals who take this view tend to 
have a number of concerns. Firstly, in their view any FTA between the US and EU – China’s largest 
and second largest trading partner – would cause significant trade diversion at the expense of Chinese 
exports.xii This is mainly because they are often competing with European and American equivalents 
respectively in each other’s markets, particularly since Chinese products are rapidly ascending global 
value chains. Secondly, a successful TTIP will undoubtedly change existing rules, thereby creating 
great uncertainty. Opponents believe that, apart from reductions in Chinese trade and investment, the 
most worrying aspect is that developed economies would be able to deploy the agreement to accelerate 
the establishment of new rules and new institutional designs, thereby profoundly reconfiguring the 
global trade architecture. This would in turn create pressure for China to follow rules that – once again 
– it has not played a part in shaping.xiii Without the binding of the multilateral framework of the WTO, 
the EU and US would be able to ignore those developing countries that have structural conflicts of 
interests with them. The developing countries will in turn become rule-takers. xiv  Some Chinese 
intellectuals have therefore called on the US and EU to make certain that any ‘fruit’ from TTIP 
negotiations, should they ever be concluded, would be shared by as many countries as possible when 
transposing them to the global level, and it is felt that if the reasonable concerns of developing countries 
are ignored, globalisation itself could be undermined, thus creating a ‘lose-lose’ situation in the North-
South model of trade.xv  Thirdly, some argue that TTIP will further undermine any remaining hope that 
Doha might be resuscitated, even marginalising the multilateral trading system entirely.xvi If the EU-
US bloc is ever decisively established, it will render the bilateral FTA far superior to the multilateral 
system, and will consequently weaken the competences and credibility of the latter no matter how open 
TTIP may ultimately be.xvii 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that China is today an extremely powerful state, with the ability to influence the shape 
of the global order in ways that it could not previously and that other emerging powers still cannot, 
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along with a broad commitment – that is perhaps stronger than even some western governments at 
present – to maintain a rules-based, liberal trading order. In this context, that Beijing has not sought to 
decisively lead the WTO out of its funk is, perhaps, not a particularly complex counterfactual puzzle, 
in that there are evidently convincing structural explanations that, up to a point, militate against such 
an investment of political capital in an era of pronounced flux.  
 
Nonetheless, as we have sought to show in this paper, on the basis of a number of conversations with 
trade policymakers and other experts in the country, China’s ‘reluctant leadership’ cannot simply be 
read off from an inauspicious context and an uncertain set of potential payoffs that, even were Doha to 
be resuscitated, appear, at best, rather meagre, and unlikely to have much impact on the broader trade 
regime itself. Chinese agency has, then, been central to this story. A range of domestic sources of 
constraint, which have been navigated in different ways and at different times by key actors, have all 
shaped a particular orientation towards multilateral trade politics that could have unfolded differently. 
Our argument here is not that such agency somehow matters more than the structural context. Rather, 
it is only by adding it in can we offer a complete picture of why things unfolded in the way they did. A 
key element of this, alongside the domestic realities noted above, is the fact that Chinese policy elites 
interpret the structural context itself in quite distinct ways when compared to the Anglophone literature. 
 
But why does this story matter, in a wider sense? We suggest three reasons. First, the collapse in the 
WTO’s shared ‘social purpose’ (Bishop and Muzaka 2018) means that multilateral trade politics are, 
today, on very thin ice: simply because the trade regime – as, again, distinct from the WTO itself – 
appears to be just about holding up at present, it does not follow that it will necessarily continue to do 
so. A range of threats exist on the horizon, and, in the case of the looming shadow cast by Trumpism, 
even much closer. This is not to say that the bicycle theorists are right. It is rather to note that the time 
lags that typify patterns of global social change are such that, a decade on from the global crisis, it may 
be too soon to confidently assert that nascent protectionist pressures will not heap even more pressure 
on the multilateral system. During the Great Depression, it took some time for countries to impose 
tariffs and other trade restrictions (Eichengreen and Irwin 2010) and then there was no WTO or similarly 
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extensive body of global rules which could militate against such protectionism when it came. It may be 
that the liberal order is surviving (Drezner 2015) or it may be that the full force of the backlash has not 
yet come.  
 
Second, and related, China represents the best possible catalyst for a resurrection of, if not the WTO 
itself, certainly a new form of multilateralism. The establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) did not take place with developing countries in mind; most did not exist in 1944, 
and the body was predicated on the simple notion of liberalising trade between broadly similar, western 
states. This fundamental ontological rationale has endured through the transition from GATT to WTO. 
So, when Doha was brought into being a month before China became a member, it was misconceived 
from the very start: not only was it never going to be a ‘development round’ – understood in the sense 
of privileging the special and differentiated treatment (SDT) concerns of a much wider number of 
developing countries over the normal pattern of across-the-board, increasingly invasive, liberalisation 
– as per the publicity, it also probably could never have been. Indeed, the very fact that SDT has 
remained highly constrained in terms of both the types of countries able to enjoy it, and the basis on 
which they can do so, evinces this. However – and this is the third point – it is intriguing that, when 
speaking to Chinese policymakers, they appear genuinely disappointed, and, in private, highly critical 
of what they perceive as US and EU attempts to undermine a multilateral system that they joined in 
good faith, and which has not delivered that which was promised for developing countries as a whole.  
 
Finally, the irony is that many ‘developing’ countries are today accruing enormous amounts of power, 
both individually and collectively. One does not have to be a realist to accept that the imbalance that 
this implies could generate serious instability and a fracture in the international system. A sensible long-
term strategy for western liberals, then, would surely be to recognise the imperative of binding the 
BRICS and other emerging states to the rules-based international order by engaging those policy 
communities within them advocating reform, and which are best-disposed to multilateralism. But this 
would also mean listening: it is western intransigence, particularly in terms of respecting the kind of 
more flexible liberalisation that is required to distribute collective gains amongst societies at wildly 
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different levels of development, that has done so much to undermine the WTO and its social purpose. 
Chinese trade policymakers attribute the ultimate collapse of Doha to the US, and claim that developing 
countries as a whole are angry because they negotiated with sincerity, even as it became clear that the 
promised development boon was unlikely to be forthcoming, and they could understand India’s demand 
for special safeguards which ultimately led to the Round’s final collapse (see also Hopewell 2015). A 
key imperative for China, going forward, is avoiding the ‘Kindelberger trap’: that is, the situation that 
befell the US during the 1930s when it failed to provide global public goods as Britain experienced 
hegemonic decline. Ways will increasingly need to be found to share this burden, of which trade 
multilateralism is a crucial component (Morton 2017). As we have shown, until now, China has indeed 
been a reluctant leader, but the time may be coming where the structural imperatives on action are so 
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